Introduction
It is difficult to define whether, and in what instances, practices implemented by dominant firms are unlawful. In particular, it is a challenge for courts and authorities to draw the line between prohibited exclusionary behaviour and valid competition on the merits. Conduct that has the potential to harm rivals may be pro-competitive, in the sense that it may improve the functioning of markets. Vigorous administrative action may thus have the unintended consequence of depriving consumers and society of the gains resulting from the practice. What is more, it may penalise firms for their success in the marketplace and favour less successful rivals. On the other hand, timid enforcement may further strengthen the position of dominant firms and eliminate the few constraints to which they are subject. Consumers and society would also suffer as a result. Intel is not interesting because of the legal stance taken by the GC, which simply followed a well-established line of case law and is as such uneventful. Its interest relates to the (arguably unprecedented) amount of academic commentary to which it gave rise. 9 What the growing number of articles devoted to the judgment reveals is that the endorsement of mainstream economic principles as a guide for law and policy-making is far from gathering a consensus. Even within the 5 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7 (hereinafter, the 'Guidance'). Commission, the approach outlined in the Discussion Paper and the Guidance remains controversial. It has been praised by some officials and openly contested by others. 10 Debates still revolve around fundamental issues, including the objectives of EU competition law and the role of economic analysis in the definition of the substantive principles of the discipline.
In spite of these discussions, the case law on exclusionary abuses is often misunderstood.
This is not surprising considering that the thrust of the literature has been devoted, first, to explaining the ways in which the different judgments are allegedly at odds with mainstream economic positions and, secondly, to proposing administrable and sound principles. There is relatively little interest in making sense of the rationale that underpins the case law. It is true that there have been attempts to establish a link between the EU courts' stance in abuse cases and ordoliberalism. 11 However, some of the key assumptions underlying this approach have been challenged as reflecting an inaccurate understanding of the tenets and evolution of that school of thought. 12 More generally, the use of the 'ordoliberal' label has never been given very clear boundaries, and is therefore not operational or meaningful. As other attempts to explain a complex legal phenomenon from the top down, this approach fails to capture the richness of the case law. Pricing below cost is also in breach of Article 102 TFEU if it can be shown to be part of a plan to eliminate a competitor. In this second scenario, the prohibition is justified by the fact that pricing below cost is driven by exclusionary purposes and that it is in itself capable of excluding equally efficient competitors. Subsequent case law has confirmed that it is not necessary to establish the likely effects of predatory pricing for it to be caught by Article 102 TFEU. In
Wanadoo, the ECJ rejected explicitly the idea that, as part of the assessment of the practice, it is necessary to show that the dominant firm would have the ability to recoup the losses incurred during the predatory pricing campaign.
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It is reasonable to infer from AKZO that pricing above cost is -at the very least - below-cost pricing. 38 An analysis of the two cases gives the impression that even above-cost prices can be deemed abusive if there is direct evidence of a plan to drive out a competitor and the position of the dominant firm approaches that of a monopoly. The unclear boundaries of the case law in this regard became apparent when the preliminary reference in Post Danmark I -which will be discussed below -reached the Court.
Tying
There are relatively fewer cases addressing the status of tying. However, they support the conclusion that this practice is, absent an objective justification, prohibited as abusive. The legal status of tying was addressed more explicitly in Microsoft I. In its decision, the Commission took the view that it could not be concluded, without more, that the integration of WMP into Windows amounted, in and of itself, to an abuse of a dominant position. As a consequence, it spelled out the mechanism through which the exclusion of rivals on the market for the tied product was to be expected. 42 When reviewing the legality of the Commission decision, the GC did not consider it necessary to show the likely effects of tying. to compete on a neighbouring market and that it leads, in addition, to the elimination of 'all competition' therein. The essence of this principle has not been disputed in subsequent case law.
In Bronner, the Court examined a preliminary reference concerning the applicability of this case law to an instance where the refusal concerned a physical input, as opposed to an intellectual property right. 44 In Microsoft I, the GC examined, in light of Magill, 45 whether the Commission had established, to the requisite legal standard, that the firm's refusal to supply interoperability information would lead to the elimination of competition from rival work group servers. 46 In
Huawei, the Court addressed a related question. It defined an additional set of 'exceptional 43 Ibid, para 1058. 44 In Deutsche Telekom, the ECJ confirmed that a 'margin squeeze' is only abusive insofar as it has an anticompetitive effect. The Commission had contended the contrary in its decision. It argued that it would be sufficient to show that the wholesale margins charged by the vertically-integrated firm to its downstream rivals do not allow the latter to operate at a profit. 48 The GC -and, on appeal, the ECJ -disagreed with this interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. They took the view that the practice is not abusive in and of itself. In Deutsche Telekom, the exclusionary effects were understood to be the necessary consequence of the fact that the incumbent's infrastructure was indispensable to compete on the relevant downstream market. 49 The need to establish the anticompetitive impact of 'margin squeeze' practices was reiterated by the ECJ in TeliaSonera.
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In that case, the Court did not exclude that that practice may have exclusionary effects even when access to the dominant firm's infrastructure is not indispensable. According to the Court, the likely exclusionary effects of the practice would derive from the fact that, in the case at hand, the intellectual property right was essential to practise a standard. As a result, the right holder 'can prevent products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on the market and, thereby, reserve to itself the manufacture of the products in question' (para 52 applicable to all customers). Because it did not correspond to individual orders, however, it was not found to be presumptively compatible with Article 102 TFEU. Moreover, the scheme was 52 Post Danmark I (n 15). 53 Irish Sugar (n 38). One of the practices challenged by the Commission in this case related to a policy of selective rebates granted to those customers based closed to the border with the UK, which were more likely to switch suppliers. 54 Compagnie Maritime Belge (n 38). In this case, the Commission challenged a policy of 'fighting ships', whereby the firm reacted aggressively to market entry. 55 See the explanation above. This is something noted by the Advocate General in his opinion in Post Danmark I (n 15), Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras 69-95. 56 Post Danmark I (n 15), para 30 ('the fact that the practice of a dominant undertaking may, like the pricing policy in issue in the main proceedings, be described as "price discrimination", that is to say, charging different customers or different classes of customers different prices for goods or services whose costs are the same or, conversely, charging a single price to customers for whom supply costs differ, cannot of itself suggest that there exists an exclusionary abuse'). See also paras 36-39 and 42-44.
retroactive, in the sense that it applied to all quantities supplied (and not only to those exceeding a certain threshold) and the reference period for the calculation of the rebates was of one year.
The Court laid down an ad hoc test that was suited for the particular nature of the scheme at hand. The test is notable in that it departs from that followed in other rebate cases. The assessment of 'all the circumstances' in Post Danmark II was not merely confined to the nature and the operation of the scheme. The Court found it necessary to consider, in addition, the features of the relevant market and the conditions of competition prevailing therein. 57 The analysis is not fundamentally different from that performed in Deutsche Telekom. For instance, the Court noted that, because Post Danmark enjoyed a statutory monopoly in relation to some of the activities, part of the demand of its customers was not contestable 58 (which made it impossible for customers to switch to an alternative supplier) and that -in part due to the features of the industry, in part due to the fact that it had been liberalised only recently -the incumbent operator had geographic coverage that its rivals were unable to match. 3. An attempt to reconcile the case law
As can be seen from the above, there are two broad categories of potentially exclusionary conduct.
In some cases, anticompetitive effects have been assumed to result from the practice and evidence to the contrary has been dismissed; in others, the Court has made it clear that the practice is abusive only insofar as it has a negative impact on competition. The challenge for scholars is to make sense of this divide. It is possible to do so if one thinks of structure of Article 101(1) TFEU.
In the same way that some agreements are deemed to restrict competition by object, some 57 Post Danmark II (n 20), para 30: 'Having regard to the particularities of the present case, it is also necessary to take into account, in examining all the relevant circumstances, the extent of Post Danmark's dominant position and the particular conditions of competition prevailing on the relevant market'. 58 Ibid. para 35. 59 Ibid, para 39.
practices are considered to be abusive by their very nature. Other practices would only be prohibited when an anticompetitive effect can be shown.
The (presumed) purpose of the practice under examination is the fundamental criterion used by the Court to draw the line between conduct that is abusive by their very nature and conduct that is not. Where it is established or presumed that a given line of conduct is part of an exclusionary strategy, it is not necessary to show any negative effects on competition.
Paraphrasing the GC in Michelin II, it would be one of the instances in which object and effect are understood to be one and the same thing. Even though the case law is less explicit on the question, effects seem to be required when the purpose of the practice is not presumed to be anticompetitive and there is no direct evidence that it has an exclusionary object.
3.1.Abusive practices by their very nature (or by object)
If one examines the range of practices that are deemed abusive by their very nature, it appears that they share a common feature. In all cases, the analysis of the Court is based on the premise that they are not a legitimate form of rivalry or, put differently, that they are not a manifestation of competition on the merits. 60 In one way or the other, the purpose of the practice under consideration is understood to be inherently anticompetitive. There are some cases in which direct or objective evidence of an anticompetitive intent is relied upon. In most cases, however, the anticompetitive motives of the firm are simply presumed. This interpretation of the case law explains why it is possible for dominant firms to rebut the presumption that their practice serves an exclusionary purpose by providing an objective justification. 60 In Hoffmann-La Roche (n 21), the Court refers (in para 91) to 'normal competition in products and services'). The Court has frequently relied upon the notion of competition on the merits in subsequent cases to draw the line between lawful and unlawful conduct. 3.1.1. Exclusive dealing and loyalty (including 'loyalty-inducing') rebates
In Hoffmann-La Roche, the ECJ set out the reasons why exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates are deemed abusive by their very nature. The Court distinguished between these practices and others, like volume-based rebates, which were found to be prima facie lawful. The latter (that is, rebates granted in consideration for an increase in the amounts supplied) were presumed to have a business justification. Prices that decrease with the amount supplied were understood to reflect the cost-savings made by the supplier. Loyalty rebates and exclusive dealing, on the other hand, were not considered to be 'based on an economic transaction which justifies this burden'. Instead, the Court presumed that they were driven by an exclusionary intent. According to the Court, these practices are 'designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access to the market'.
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It is easy to draw immediate analogies between this passage from Hoffmann-La Roche and the case law on restrictions by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, where the underlying analysis is typically very similar. When determining whether an agreement is restrictive by its very nature, the EU courts essentially examine whether the restraints contained in it are objectively justified or pursue a legitimate objective. If they come to the conclusion that they are a plausible means to achieve a pro-competitive aim, the EU courts exclude the 'by object' qualification and examine their effects on the relevant market(s) concerned. 
Predatory pricing
The purpose of the legal test found in the AKZO ruling is to identify the instances in which an aggressive pricing campaign pursues an anticompetitive object. Where the dominant firm charges prices below average total cost and there is direct evidence of a plan to drive a competitor out of the market, the Court finds it appropriate to presume that the practice lacks pro-competitive virtues and is abusive by its very nature. Where the dominant firm prices below average variable cost, in turn, it is reasonable to infer that the practice has no plausible explanation other than the exclusion of a rival. As explained by the ECJ in AKZO, it is in principle irrational for a firm to price at this level, since an increase in output would lead to an increase in the losses made by the company. The case law on tying suggests that the rationale for the prima facie prohibition of the practice is not fundamentally different from the logic underlying the legal status of exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates. In cases like Tetra Pak II, the GC suggested that the practice is prohibited primarily because it is presumed to serve an exclusionary purpose. In that case, the GC concluded 69 Case T-219/99, British Airways (n 2), para 288. 70 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways (n 2), para 67. See also Michelin II (n 2), para 240; and Intel (n 8), para 78. 71 AKZO (n 35), para 71. As explained by the Court, '[a] dominant undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position, since each sale generates a loss, namely the total amount of the fixed costs (that is to say, those which remain constant regardless of the quantities produced) and, at least, part of the variable costs relating to the unit produced'.
that the tying practices under consideration were part of a 'strategy aiming to make the customer totally dependent on Tetra Pak […], thereby excluding in particular any possibility of competition'. 72 In the same vein, it held that they 'beyond their ostensible purpose' and were instead 'intended to strengthen Tetra Pak's dominant position by reinforcing its customers' economic dependence on it'. 
3.2.Practices that might have exclusionary effects
The Court has not been very explicit about the reasons why some practices are abusive only when an exclusionary effect can be shown. In cases like Deutsche Telekom or Post Danmark II, the Court required evidence of an anticompetitive impact, but did not provide the rationale for treating these practices differently from conduct that is prima facie prohibited. It is useful to resort to Article 101(1) TFEU case law to understand why a 'by effect' category has emerged in Article 102 TFEU case law. As explained above, the question of whether an agreement is restrictive by its very nature typically revolves around whether the contentious restraints can be objectively justified (or whether they can be said to pursue a 'legitimate objective') in the economic and legal context of which they are part. Against this background, it seems reasonable to argue that practices such as a 'margin squeeze' or a refusal to deal are understood to be a plausible form of competition on the merits. This fact would explain, in turn, why the Court finds it inappropriate to consider them abusive by their very nature.
This interpretation of the case law is useful to explain, first, refusal to deal cases. The
Court has confined to 'exceptional circumstances' the instances in which a dominant firm can be required to license an intellectual property right or give access to a facility. Advocate General Jacobs explained at length in his opinion in Bronner why it is generally pro-competitive, and in 72 Tetra Pak II (n 40), para 135. 73 Ibid, para 140.
the interest of consumers, for a company to refuse to deal with a rival. 74 It is logical for a firm that has invested in the development of a product, a technology or a facility to keep the results of its efforts for itself. More importantly, the very purpose of competition law is to promote such efforts.
Thus, imposing a general duty to deal with rivals can be said to be anticompetitive in the sense that it would harm firms' incentives to improve their position in the marketplace by developing new products and alternative competitive strategies. 75 Against this background, it seems only logical to set a strict test that reflects the idea that a refusal to deal is generally a valid expression of competition on the merits. 75 As explained by AG Jacobs, '[i]n the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the short term it would be reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits. In Post Danmark I, the Court seemingly reached the same conclusion in relation to selective price cuts. There seems to be nothing inherently anticompetitive in an attempt by a dominant company to attract new customers by means of targeted discounts. So long as the discounts do not amount to predatory pricing, the practice looks like the very manifestation of the competitive process and, by extension, of the behaviour that competition law seeks to encourage.
It would therefore be inappropriate to presume that a policy of selective price cuts lacks a procompetitive rationale -unless, of course, one claims that trying to thrive in the marketplace is anticompetitive. In the same vein, the EU courts had already held in several rulings before Post Danmark I that dominant firms are entitled to compete on the merits and to take proportionate measures aimed at protecting their commercial interests.
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It is submitted that a similar idea explains why quantity rebates are deemed prima facie legal and standardised schemes are only prohibited where they are likely to have exclusionary effects. Rebates 'linked solely to the volume of purchases' are lawful insofar as they are understood to reflect the cost savings made by the dominant supplier. 78 It is difficult to infer an anticompetitive motivation from such schemes. The Court considers that, in such a case, the lower prices strictly reflect the economies of scale resulting from an increase in output. Accordingly, they would be a valid form of competition on the merits. The legality rule does not extend to standardised rebates granted 'on the basis of the aggregate orders placed over a given period'.
Insofar as they are primarily based on volume, however, they are formally closer to those that are prima facie lawful than to those that are prima facie prohibited.
Towards legal consistency in Article 102 TFEU case law
77 See in this sense Irish Sugar (n 38), para 112. 78 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 21), para 100.
It cannot be emphasised enough that competition policy is implemented through law. Broad and vague prohibitions such as those found in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have to be fleshed out and
given an operational meaning in concrete factual scenarios. It is therefore difficult to expect that all rulings will be inspired by a single, all-encompassing logic. EU courts draw inspiration from a variety of -legal and economic -sources, which tend to change over time. As a result, the rationale underlying some rulings might hint at a particular understanding of the discipline, whereas others may be interpreted as reflecting another, possibly conflicting, approach to competition law issues. These tensions became particularly apparent when Post Danmark I and Tomra were delivered by the Court within a few weeks' difference. The issues of principle raised in Post Danmark I strongly suggested that Article 102 TFEU is only concerned with the exclusion of equally efficient rivals. Tomra, in turn, reiterated the traditional approach towards exclusive dealing and rebates, which is not informed by such considerations. In Delimitis, the ECJ examined whether exclusive dealing is restrictive by object. As in other cases, it noted that agreements requiring exclusivity from the distributor may serve procompetitive purposes. It concluded they are not, in and of themselves, contrary to Article 101 (1) TFEU. 82 The Court pointed out that such agreements may be in the interest of both suppliers (which would be able to plan their production more effectively and preserve their investments) and distributors (which would obtain better contractual conditions and secure guaranteed supplies). 83 Against this background, the Court set out the principles that an authority or a claimant must follow to establish the restrictive effects of exclusive dealing obligations.
According to the ruling, it would be necessary to show that access to the relevant market by a new entrant would be foreclosed and that the supplier contributes significantly to such an outcome.
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Had the logic of Delimitis been applied in the context of Article 102 TFEU, the case law would, in all likelihood, have evolved differently. As observed above, the ECJ held in HoffmannLa Roche that exclusive dealing is abusive by its very nature because it was presumed to lack a valid pro-competitive justification. As explained at length above, this presumption was endorsedand often articulated explicitly -in subsequent case law. In addition, the Court assumed in
Hoffmann-La Roche that exclusive dealing has exclusionary effects when implemented by a dominant firm. This assumption is at odds with the rationale underpinning Delimitis, in which the Court made it clear that foreclosure cannot simply be assumed to be the inevitable consequence of exclusivity obligations. According to the latter ruling, it is necessary to explore the features of the 82 Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG [1991] ECR I-935, paras 10-12. 83 In para 11, the Court noted that 'as a result of his exclusive purchasing obligation and the prohibition on competition, the reseller concentrates his sales efforts on the distribution of the contract goods. The supply agreements, moreover, [allow] the supplier to plan his sales over the duration of the agreement and to organize production and distribution effectively'. In para 12, it noted that these arrangements 'also have advantages for the reseller, inasmuch as they enable him to gain access under favourable conditions. […] The reseller's and supplier's shared interest in promoting sales of the contract goods likewise secures for the reseller the benefit of the supplier's assistance in guaranteeing product quality and customer service'. 84 Ibid, paras 15-26.
market as a whole. 85 Interestingly, the factors identified by the Court in Delimitis are close to those that were deemed relevant to define the lawfulness of standardised rebate schemes in Post Danmark II.
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The difficulty to reconcile Delimitis and Hoffmann-La Roche became apparent in several
Article 102 TFEU rulings, including British Plasterboard 87 and Intel. In these cases, the GC was confronted with the principles set out by the ECJ in Delimitis, which suggested that exclusive dealing cannot be considered to be anticompetitive by its very nature. Both in British Plasterboard and Intel, the GC acknowledged that exclusivity obligations may have a pro-competitive justification and that they may be normal commercial practices in some industries. However, it did not directly address the tension between the two lines of case law. Instead, the GC pointed out that dominant firms have, in any event, a 'special responsibility' not to impair the functioning of markets. 88 The practical consequences of the tension between Article 101 and 102 TFEU case law became apparent in Van den Bergh Foods. 89 The GC examined the status of a set of (de facto) exclusive dealing obligations under both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As a result, it was required to carefully consider (in line with Delimitis) whether the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement had been established by the Commission to the requisite legal standard. On the other hand, and somewhat paradoxically, it suggested, in no more than two paragraphs, that such a lengthy analysis of the exclusionary effects of the practice is not necessary where the supplier holds a dominant position on the relevant market.
90 85 Ibid, para 20, where the Court explains that '[t]he existence of a bundle of similar contracts, even if it has a considerable effect on the opportunities for gaining access to the market, is not, however, sufficient in itself to support a finding that the relevant market is inaccessible, inasmuch as it is only one factor, amongst others, pertaining to the economic and legal context in which an agreement must be appraised […] . The other factors to be taken into account are, in the first instance, those also relating to opportunities for access'. As the case law stands, practices that can be seen as functionally equivalent are not always subject to the same substantive legal test. The substantive test that applies to one practice is sometimes stricter than that applying to comparable conduct. For instance, one practice may be deemed abusive by its very nature, while functionally equivalent behaviour one may not. Similarly, the threshold of anticompetitive effects may be higher in one case. The latter issue is best exemplified by the tension that exists between the case law on refusals to deal, on the one hand, and 'margin squeeze' abuses, on the other. As pointed out above, a 'margin squeeze' amounts in practice to a refusal to deal. A dominant firm may indeed refuse to deal with its downstream rivals altogether or may instead choose to do so on terms and conditions that make it impossible or unreasonably difficult for them to remain on the market. Insofar as the two practices are functionally equivalent, one could argue convincingly that they should be subject to the same substantive standards. In particular, there would be compelling reasons to claim that evidence of (actual or likely) exclusionary effects would not be sufficient to establish the abusive nature of a 'margin squeeze'.
It would, in addition, be necessary to show that access to the input or the facility is indispensable within the meaning of Bronner and Magill.
In linkLine, the US Supreme Court concluded that a 'margin squeeze' is not a stand-alone breach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 95 Accordingly, a claimant would need to show that the 94 Tetra Laval (n 92), paras 41-44.
defendant is under a duty to deal with downstream rivals as a matter of competition law, or that the retail prices it charges to end-users are predatory. When confronted directly with the same question, raised by the national court in TeliaSonera, the ECJ reached a different conclusion. It is clear after this ruling that it is not necessary to show that the relevant input is indispensable for
Article 102 TFEU to apply to an alleged 'margin squeeze'. Evidence of an anticompetitive effect alone would be sufficient to establish an abuse. In TeliaSonera, the Court denied the relevance of
Bronner as a precedent, the scope of which was narrowly interpreted as concerning a refusal to deal alone. 96 The Court also suggested that a 'margin squeeze' abuse is the consequence of the unfair (or excessive) nature of the prices charged by the vertically-integrated supplier. 97 In the aftermath of TeliaSonera, it is safer for a dominant company to refuse to deal with a rival altogether than to deal with a rival on disadvantageous terms and conditions. The theoretical and practical problems that result from the tension between these two lines of case law have been abundantly discussed in the literature. 
Selective price cuts and rebates
Post Danmark I is in several respects at odds with the logic underpinning the case law on loyalty (including 'loyalty-inducing') rebates. The latter are deemed not to have an economic justification.
It is from the (presumed) absence of an objective justification that the exclusionary intent of the dominant firm is inferred in rebate cases. If one applied the same logic to the conduct examined by the Court in Post Danmark I, it would be reasonable to conclude that selective price cuts are also prima facie abusive. Unlike quantity rebates, selective price cuts do not reflect any cost savings made by the dominant firm. They are merely intended to attract customers away from a rival.
95 linkline (n 76). 96 TeliaSonera (n 14), paras 47-59. 97 Ibid, paras 25-34. 98 For an analysis, see O'Donoghue and Padilla (n 18) 399-404.
Accordingly, it would be appropriate to label them as 'disloyalty-inducing' discounts and thus to presume that they lack a valid economic justification. This was in fact the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU proposed by several interested parties taking part in the proceedings -including the and/or more clearly pro-competitive than the latter. As already explained, the ostensible purpose of selective price cuts is to expand the customer base at the expense of a competitor. This can also be said to be the very object of discounts conditional upon exclusivity. Secondly, it is not easy to see what makes loyalty rebates more exclusionary than selective price cuts. The latter can be an effective strategy to increase the dominant firm's market share at the expense of rivals, which is why they were considered to be abusive by their very nature in Irish Sugar and Compagnie Maritime Belge.
Standardised and loyalty rebates
Following Post Danmark II, the legal status of rebate schemes is uncertain. The case law is no longer internally consistent. Before the ruling, rebates were deemed unlawful when they were formally conditional upon exclusivity or when they had equivalent effects (that is, whether they had a 'loyalty-inducing' effect). As explained above, the assessment of 'all the circumstances' in If tensions in the case law are assessed in this light (that is, as a natural and inevitable consequence of legal evolution), it becomes clear that some features of Article 102 TFEU case law need to be refined. This is so not because they reflect a particular objective or view of the field, but because they do not capture the knowledge and experience acquired over the years. It is submitted that the logic underlying some rulings is a source of 'frictions' that is difficult to defend on theoretical grounds and is as such unlikely to survive in the long run. Cases like Hoffmann-La Roche (on exclusive dealing) and Tetra Pak II (on tying) are based on plausible premises about the nature and purpose of, respectively, exclusive dealing and tying. The fact that Delimitis (on exclusive dealing) and Tetra Laval (on tying) reflect conflicting views about the same practices means that they are grounded on a more accurate understanding of the instances in which they are likely to have anticompetitive effects and of the reasons why firms (including dominant firms) resort to them.
The examples that follow show that the tensions observed in the case law can be meaningfully addressed in the same way courts typically address inconsistencies in other legal fields. The approach proposed to address the observed tensions is based on the criteria defined by the Court in Cartes Bancaires. According to that ruling, the question of whether a given practice is restrictive of competition by object is to be established in light of the lessons of experience and economic analysis. Both criteria shed light on whether conduct can be safely presumed to be driven by exclusionary purposes and whether anticompetitive effects are the inevitable consequence of their implementation. The Court referred to horizontal price-fixing by cartels as an example of an agreement that meets the two conditions. 101 Where experience and economic analysis suggests that one of this two is not fulfilled (as would be the case if the practice is found to be plausibly pro-competitive), the 'by object' category would be inappropriate. 101 Cartes Bancaires (n 63), para 51.
Predatory pricing and selective price cuts
Post Danmark I provides a valuable example of the sort of tensions that have arisen in relation to the application of Article 102 TFEU. It also illustrates the way in which conflicting lines of case law may be reconciled by means of incremental decision-making. As explained above, the ECJ and the national court submitting the reference were confronted with two competing logics. As defended by, inter alia, the Commission, it was possible to argue, in light of Compagnie Maritime
Belge and Irish Sugar, that a policy of selective price cuts is presumptively abusive irrespective of its effects. From this perspective, the targeted nature of the discounts would be presumed to have no justification other than the exclusion of competition. On the other hand, one could infer from AKZO that the practice could only be presumed to be anticompetitive if the discounts were found to amount to pricing below average variable costs. By relying upon the latter line of case law, the ECJ opted for a benchmark which prior research in the field had already shown to be a safe one, in the sense that it makes it possible to establish an accurate presumption of the instances in which a practice serves no purpose other than the exclusion of a rival.
Exclusive dealing and rebates
The presumption that exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates lack a valid economic justification pervades the case law. This presumption would be unproblematic if it captured the nature and purpose of the abovementioned practices. If one looks at the experience acquired after decades of enforcement, it appears that it does not. An analysis of the relevant rulings reveals, first, that exclusive dealing obligations are often required by firms that lack the ability to foreclose competition. The market share of the supplier in Delimitis was modest by any standard. generally, it is difficult to dispute that exclusive dealing arrangements are widespread. 103 This fact alone suggests that a presumption that the practice is driven by exclusionary purposes is at odds with the observable behaviour of firms across sectors. The experience drawn from some Article 102 TFEU cases suggests that these conclusions are not affected by the degree of market power enjoyed by the firm. In other words, they also hold true also for dominant firms. After a careful analysis of the rebate schemes at stake in Michelin II, Motta concluded that were several factors strongly suggesting that they were not part of an exclusionary strategy. 104 In several respects, the rebate schemes examined by the GC in that case looked closer in nature to arrangements such as selective distribution and franchising, both of which are prima facie compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU. 105 Secondly, the experience acquired after decades of case law strongly suggests that exclusive dealing and rebates are not invariably exclusionary. The fundamental reason why
Michelin II and British Airways gave rise to considerable controversy related to the fact that rivals had been able to thrive during the relevant period, and even improve their position at the expense of the dominant firm. 106 The evidence resulting from these rulings is consistent with the consensus positions of economists, reflected in the report issued in 2005 by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy. 107 Economic analysis provides no support for a position that assumes that exclusive dealing and functionally equivalent practices are necessarily exclusionary. practice, 112 operating systems for PCs. 113 Even though it took the view that Microsoft had the ability to engage in a foreclosure strategy, 114 the Commission concluded that the operation was unlikely to have anticompetitive effects. 115 The analysis and the conclusions reached were subsequently validated by the GC. 116 Another example is Microsoft I. The Commission decision in that case was controversial because the alleged tying did not have appreciable exclusionary effects, in the sense that it did not have an observable impact on rivals' ability and incentive to thrive in the relevant market. 
Conclusions
It is remarkable that debates around the appropriate treatment of potentially abusive practices remain as alive as they were a decade ago. The purpose of this piece is to show the potential of legal analysis to shed light on the ongoing controversies. The rationale behind the case law is not often given the prominence it deserves by commentators, and it is not always well understood as a result. It is possible to discern two different categories of practices in the case law. There is, on the one hand, conduct that is considered to be anticompetitive by its very nature and, on the other, conduct that is only prohibited if an anticompetitive effect can be shown. The difference between the two appears to be the same that exists between agreements that restrict competition by object and by effect under Article 101(1) TFEU. Where the case law is seen in this light, it becomes clear that the controversies surrounding Article 102 TFEU are not as far-reaching and fundamental as some authors tend to assume.
This approach is a promising starting point to engage in a critical analysis of the case law.
A legal perspective reveals, first, that the case law is richer than commonly understood. There is a tendency to provide an overly simplified picture of the ways in which Article 102 TFEU has been interpreted by the EU courts. Upon closer scrutiny, it appears that the case law already captures the essence of some positions with which it is sometimes assumed to be at odds. However, these operations are not prima facie prohibited. Their legality is established instead by assessing their likely effects on competition.
It has been argued that the natural approach to deal with the observed tensions in the case law is to resort to the test developed by the Court in Cartes Bancaires. In order to qualify an agreement as restrictive of competition by object, it is necessary to consider the lessons of experience and economic analysis. Such insights show whether it is accurate to presume that the practices serve no pro-competitive purpose (or that they have no 'legitimate objective', which is the expression used in Cartes Bancaires) and/or to assume that they have anticompetitive effects.
Even though it is implicit in the ruling, this approach is not fundamentally different from that found in Post Danmark I. In that case, the Court was confronted with two conflicting lines of case law, and concluded that the practice was not in itself anticompetitive. The Court will have to address similar frictions in the future. This piece has shown how they can be effectively and meaningfully tackled by trying to ensure consistency within the EU competition law system.
